SASHA Guest Post: “Deliver Us From Virtue” by Rocket Kirchner

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Today’s article is a guest post by musician, activist, long-time friend of SASHA, and Christian evangelist Rocket Kirchner.

Lao Tzu  says that when a man praises virtue, he turns other men into criminals. WOW! Now, that is really  throwing the gauntlet down. I have always found it ludicrous how we humans actually think that we are moral, ethical, virtuous people, and that we actually waste our time seeking to exalt such nonsense. Seems like we need a good absurdist comedian and a busload of clowns to dance around us and burst our pompous  bubble. In the Middle Ages they had what was called “The Feast of Fools,” where one day out of the year, people would dress up as magistrates, popes, and cardinals, in a mock ceremony — Harvey Cox wrote a great book on the subject. The somewhat equivalent to this in the Far East is called “Nasty Night,” where monks walk around one night of the year and yell nasty things to anyone or anything.

When we seek to be good, we play with fire. This fire culminates in us externalizing evil (as if we are above it),  and establishes the fundamentalist mindset. It matters not what one believes, or what one does not believe, that makes one a fundamentalist. What makes one a Fundie is praising virtue as if it has any intrinsic quality of authentic goodness in and of itself. In reality, this activity has the makings of constructing a ladder of self exaltation over others.

The complete blindness of the man who thinks that his good is the good is the peak of attachment to an illusory self. The root of every bloody political revolution, be it religious or anti-religious, or just plain an ideology of thinking that it will make a difference and make the world a better place, has separated humans from each other. The minute we think we are good, we are doomed. The only crack that we have in an kind of real goodness is not to be conscious of it, not to seek it, but rather to simply love people in word and in deed including  loving those who hate us. We must seek to serve others and forget about all of this moralistic crap. Period. For only love and servanthood can deliver us from virtue, and being delivered from virtue is the same as being delivered from evil.

Rocket Kirchner is a long-time friend of SASHA. He is a professional musician, pacifism activist, Christian evangelist, and life-long student of philosophy.

Helpful resources:

Godisimaginary.com
Iron Chariots Wiki
Skeptics’ Annotated Bible / Skeptics’ Annotated Qur’an
AtheismResource.com
TalkOrigins.org

YouTubers: Evid3nc3, Thunderf00t, TheAmazingAtheist, The Atheist Experience, Edward Current,NonStampCollector, Mr. Deity, Richard Dawkins, QualiaSoup

Blogs: Greta Christina, PZ Myers, The Friendly Atheist, WWJTD?, Debunking Christianity, SkepChick

and don’t forget… other SASHA members! We are here for you, too!

SASHA Guest Post: “Capitalism & Freedom” (book review) by Benjamin Schulz

Welcome to the official MU SASHA daily blog!

First time here? Read this.

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Today’s article is a guest post by computer scientist and long-time friend of SASHA, Benjamin Schulz.

In the five decades since its original publication, Milton Friedman’s “Capitalism and Freedom” has become a landmark of libertarian politics and neoliberal economic thought.  It is a sign of the book’s tremendous influence that many of its arguments are taken starkly for granted in the political climate today.  The broad popularity that “Capitalism and Freedom” has enjoyed masks the challenges presented by the climate in which it was originally composed: in the 1950s and 1960s, Keynesian theories of the economy held considerable sway, and memories of the Great Depression provided a powerful political impetus for many of the initiatives to which Friedman’s argument is opposed.  If nothing else, the subsequent changes to the intellectual climate in the following decades give considerable force to Friedman’s retrospective on his own work: “Only a crisis — actual or perceived — produces real change.  When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend upon the ideas that are lying around.”  “Capitalism and Freedom”, an appeal to the general public, marks Friedman as a public intellectual, and his subsequent success in that role is worthy of note by all intellectuals, regardless of their stance toward Friedman.

Friedman’s main argument is simple and very direct: the principles of classical liberalism entail that individuals should be able to exercise as much personal discretion as possible in the conduct of their own business through market exchanges.  As a corollary, government regulation of market exchanges should be as limited as possible.  While this argument was not new at the time of Friedman’s work, Friedman’s exposition of the ideas is articulate and clear.  The subsequent conclusions of the work, that less regulation is both more conducive to smooth economic development, and better in accordance with the liberal democratic ideal, have since become a standard part of the political discourse.  Friedman deserves credit as one of their essential forebears.

What distinguishes “Capitalism and Freedom” from many other expositions of the libertarian argument is its distinctly economic perspective.  The book’s strongest portions make simple and fairly convincing arguments, for instance, that occupational licensure prevents and undue barrier to gainful employment without increasing the quality of services offered, and that social welfare programs, such as public housing, are less economically efficient than direct cash giveaways.  In particular, the ingenuity displayed in the argument against even the licensing of physicians is impressive and, though certainly controversial, is well worth contemplation.  Overall, Friedman shows considerable knowledge of the ways in which state-administered programs may thoroughly fail to achieve their intended ends, and skillfully raises important practical considerations in the pursuit of such goals.  The book’s argument also touches upon the elements of monetary policy and currency exchange, which are the lesser-known but more essential foundation of Friedman’s economic career.  These would perhaps have enjoyed a lengthier treatment.  These subjects nonetheless fit well with the other parts of the book, and serve as interesting introduction to some of the related problems.

“Capitalism and Freedom” is weaker, unfortunately, in its philosophical and theoretical elements.  Although the book’s popular audience probably makes it unsuitable for a highly technical discussion of economic theory, many of its further flung generalizations rest on much shakier foundations than its more specific points.  To his credit, Friedman does a good job of pointing out those specific economic issues on which he is asserting his professional opinion, but about which could be some considerable debate, e.g. tax policy, and the financing of Social Security.  There were other points at which I found justification to be lacking, such as Friedman’s lightly argued assertion that a private monopoly is preferable to a nationalized or government-regulated industry.  The greater danger, I fear, is that Friedman’s contemporary fame as an economist may be an invitation to overestimate the sophistication of his stated philosophical positions and their underlying assumptions.  A prime example of such simplistic assumptions is found in the Chapter X, “On the Distribution of Income”, in which Friedman asserts that “we are generally much readier to accept inequalities arising from chance than those clearly attributable to merit.”  Certainly, there can be some honest debate on such an assumption, but it is by no means self-evident.  This lack of self-evidence is illustrated by considering that the precise negation of Friedman’s assumption, namely that we are and should be less, not more, willing to accept inequalities of chance than of merit, is the cornerstone of John Rawl’s highly influential work of political philosophy, “A Theory of Justice.”  Similarly, Friedman makes irregular, patchwork use of the notion of “neighborhood effects” (costs to persons not willingly participating in an exchange) without more closely examining why they should be applicable in some cases but not others.  While a theory dealing with these issues more thoroughly presents a tremendous challenge, and is well beyond the scope of the book, it is important to separate Friedman’s expert economic observations from his occasional political and philosophical leanings.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the book is Friedman’s impressively principled stances, which occasionally straddle conventional political lines.  For example, Friedman argues controversially against forced desegregation of private businesses, while applying the same reasoning to reject so-called “right to work” laws which prohibit the formation of “closed shops”, wherein union membership is required for employment.  Although something of an anachronism today, Friedman’s stance against the draft provides another interesting example.

“Capitalism and Freedom”, is still a fairly short work, and would probably be well supplemented with further reading.  An obvious recommendation is Robert Nozick’s classic, “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”, which better develops many of the arguments for libertarian theories of property and exchange that Friedman seems to presume.  Interested readers would probably also enjoy Thomas Friedman’s (no relation) “The World Is Flat”, a very popular anecdotal discussion of the future of global capitalism.  Naomi Klein’s painstakingly researched expose, “The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism”, directly criticizes Friedman’s position by describing many very serious contemporary problems that free markets seem unable to resolve.

All told, “Capitalism and Freedom” is a worthwhile read for persons of all political persuasions.  Conservatives and libertarians will find much to sympathize with, and leftist thinkers will find an engaging examination of some of the practical problems that attend constraints on the free market.  While I do not personally agree with many of Friedman’s conclusions, it is nonetheless refreshing to read an opposing viewpoint that retains its force and directness while remaining principled and well-reasoned.

Benjamin Schulz is a computer scientist and long-time friend of SASHA whose regular blog, “Hot, Cold, Sun, Rain: Practical Spirituality, Irregular Philosophy, and Personal Civics” appears here. 

Helpful resources:

Godisimaginary.com
Iron Chariots Wiki
Skeptics’ Annotated Bible / Skeptics’ Annotated Qur’an
AtheismResource.com
TalkOrigins.org

YouTubers: Evid3nc3, Thunderf00t, TheAmazingAtheist, The Atheist Experience, Edward Current,NonStampCollector, Mr. Deity, Richard Dawkins, QualiaSoup

Blogs: Greta Christina, PZ Myers, The Friendly Atheist, WWJTD?, Debunking Christianity, SkepChick, Rationally Speaking

SASHA Guest Post: “Can we be atheists and believe in knowledge?” by Alex Papulis

Welcome to the official MU SASHA daily blog!

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Today’s article is a guest post by Alex Papulis.

I would like to address this question by first looking at the issue of free will. We start with one premise: all causes are physical. Events are caused by antecedent physical states of the world in conjunction with physical laws. Our thoughts, intentions, choices, decisions, deliberations, etc. are all physical events, and as such are caused by antecedent physical states of the world in conjunction with physical laws.

To say that something is free is to say, at least, that it is the source of its actions. It is clear, though, that our actions are the result of the world being the way it is, and not some “free” agent making a choice and acting it out. Our brains are the way they are at any given point as the result of antecedent states of the world and physical laws relevant to brain function, development, etc. Our thoughts, intentions, etc. are what they are, in turn, as the result of our brains being the way they are in conjunction with the relevant physical laws. The causal chain stretches through us, and so the source of our choices, thoughts, actions, behavior, the very state we are in now, lies beyond ourselves.

Now, it’s either the case that an event is deterministically caused or indeterministically caused. In either case, events are the result of antecedent states of the world acting according to the laws of nature, and whether or not an event is necessitated by antecedent states doesn’t alter the fact that it is the result of those states and laws. As such, an event that is indeterminately caused is still not the product of some “free” agent, as nothing besides the antecedent states of the world and the laws of nature is responsible for the resulting state.

We do not choose to anything. We “choose” to, say, get up and go to work for the same reason that our heart beats: the antecedent state of the world was such as to cause it to be so. When a leaf falls from a tree, it’s because the world was such as to cause that to happen. Likewise with our thoughts, intentions, decisions, emotions, preferences, actions, behavior, etc. There are no causally independent agents moving things.

We now turn to the larger question. Our beliefs are physical events, caused by antecedent states of the world in conjunction with physical laws. Just as our intentions, desires, choices, etc. are caused in us, so also are our beliefs. We hold the beliefs that we hold because the antecedent states of the world and the laws of nature are such as to cause them, and there’s no causally independent agent that influences which beliefs are caused/held.

We see, then, that our beliefs are not held for reasons. We don’t hold a belief because the evidence supported it. Rather, nature produces in us a “conclusion”, a belief that we have examined evidence, a belief that the process of examining evidence leads us to truth, and even a belief that we freely came to a conclusion. In fact, every belief we hold is equally the product of antecedent physical causes. We have the belief that we reason and listen to argument and deduce and infer, but the very belief that we do these things is just as much a product of antecedent physical states of the world as a leaf falling from a tree. Regardless of whether these events are determinate or indeterminate, there’s no agent independent of physical causes. Our beliefs are “given” to us by nature, and there aren’t causally independent agents that decide what to accept.

Why the believer in Mohammed and the believer in the Flying Spaghetti Monster believe what they believe is explained in the same way: they don’t have a choice. Likewise with the atheist and the Buddhist. If all causes are physical, the Christian does not hold his beliefs for some reason. They’re simply what he was given.

We can be atheists and believe in knowledge, but what would be the reason for that belief?

Alex Papulis is a non-degree-seeking, non-transfer Degree-seeking Transfer student at Mizzou. After getting a B.A. in Economics in St. Louis and spending some time abroad, he’s settled on philosophy.  He’s enjoyed his year at Mizzou, and looks forward to starting an MA program in Milwaukee next fall.  It would be easier for him to get his assignments done if SASHA wasn’t around.

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Helpful resources:

Godisimaginary.com
Iron Chariots Wiki
Skeptics’ Annotated Bible / Skeptics’ Annotated Qur’an
AtheismResource.com
TalkOrigins.org

YouTubers: Evid3nc3, Thunderf00t, TheAmazingAtheist, The Atheist Experience, Edward Current, NonStampCollector, Mr. Deity, Richard Dawkins, QualiaSoup

Blogs: Greta Christina, PZ Myers, The Friendly Atheist, WWJTD?, Debunking Christianity, SkepChick

and don’t forget… other SASHA members! We are here for you, too!

SASHA Guest Post: “Can rationalism become unreasonable?” by Rocket Kirchner

Welcome to the official MU SASHA daily blog!

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Today’s article is a guest post by musician, activist, long-time friend of SASHA, and Christian evangelist Rocket Kirchner.

One of the great contributions of Neitzche and Kierkegaard to philosophy, for better or worse, is that they both took the word ”irrational” out of the pejorative. These rebels of the 19th century stood against everyone using the Hegelian dialectic, insisting that existence is a category that relates to the individual, not based on axioms or systems. Both Kierkegaard and Neitzche stood shoulder-to-shoulder in their challenge to the mindset that rationalism was the be-all and end-all. Where they differed, however, was that Neitzche’s answer was the will to power, while Kierkegaard’s was surrendering the will to God. Either way, their inner journeys and how they so brilliantly expressed them in philosophical form were never objectively verifiable or subject to the approval of the Vienna school of Popperian falsification, either with a priori or a postiori certainty.

Rationalism, which sprung as a movement from the Cartesian cogito till now, has reached such a hyper-state in our time that–in my view–we need a balancing act (if only for the sake of argument) from these two genuis rebels to be thrown in the dialectical hopper, to see if rationalism itself has lost its sense of reason. Often when I am in discussions with very intellegent and well-meaning atheists, there seems to be a bottom line on an absolute rationality in order to settle issues concerning questions of perception of reality itself. A good case in point would be a conversation like this:

Atheist:

Seeing as you are a Christian practitioner, I like your practical elements of making this world a better place for others, even if you are philosophically coming from a place of unreality. (Substitute Easter Bunny, Spaghetti Monster, et al).

Me:

Yes, we can agree on making this world a better place, but in all due respect, I fail to see why you would posit a tautological statement that I am coming from a place of unreality.

Atheist:

Why do you fail to see that?

Me:

Because in order to define unreality, you must first define its opposite, namely reality, and that is a very tall order.

And so it goes. The atheist  in question here will, 9 times out of 10, define reality in the Hegelian sense that “the real is rational and the rational is real.” But is it?

The question is begged–Can this all-encompassing rationalism take in (or leave out) enough of the big picture to become paradoxically in and of itself unreasonable? Even in this question, Godel’s incompleteness theorem, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, and Schrodinger’s Cat gnaws at the hyper-rationalist, casting doubt on the ever-proving problem of exact reasoning and perfect verifiable measurement, leaving reality itself, as Kant said, unknowable.

It remains a mystery. Or does it? Now, the thinking deist, theist, Christian, Jew, Buddhist, Muslim , et al lets the mystery be. Does that make them unreasonable, solipsistic, naive? Are they living in an unreal paradigm? Or is the shoe on the other foot? Is the atheist being unreasonable when embracing an all-encompassing rationalism that claims to have a patent on reality, something that cannot be proven anyway? In other words: Is the ”-ism” in rationalism an impossible overeach to unreality with a Spaghetti Monster and Easter Bunny lurking in their world?

I trust that the reader will not think I’m going out on a limb when I say that any man who becomes only a reasoning machine, no matter how brilliant, is in real danger of allowing his mind to become an ”interloper” that blocks the potential for a full sense of clarity, which we can embrace as human individuals. The fact of the matter is that as a Christian Humanist myself, I have worked well in Orthopraxis with my fellow atheist Humanist friends with no problems. But we all must be very careful, definitionally, with the word REALITY. Anyone who lays claim to it, or seeks to disprove it, becomes unreasonable, by way of assertion devoid of logical deduction.

Rocket Kirchner is a long-time friend of SASHA. He is a professional musician, pacifism activist, Christian evangelist, and life-long student of philosophy.

Helpful resources:

Godisimaginary.com
Iron Chariots Wiki
Skeptics’ Annotated Bible / Skeptics’ Annotated Qur’an
AtheismResource.com
TalkOrigins.org

YouTubers: Evid3nc3, Thunderf00t, TheAmazingAtheist, The Atheist Experience, Edward Current,NonStampCollector, Mr. Deity, Richard Dawkins, QualiaSoup

Blogs: Greta Christina, PZ Myers, The Friendly Atheist, WWJTD?, Debunking Christianity, SkepChick

and don’t forget… other SASHA members! We are here for you, too!

SASHA Guest Post: “Consciousness, Lost & Found” by Benjamin Schulz

Welcome to the official MU SASHA daily blog!

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Today’s article is a guest post by computer scientist, graduate research assistant at the University of Missouri, and friend of SASHA, Ben Schulz.

People say consciousness is a problem. The origin of the problem, as posed to philosophy and science, is actually quite straightforward. We live at a point in history where no facet of the universe seems to lie beyond the reach of scientific explanation, including consciousness itself. There is something about the subjective experience of consciousness, however, that makes these explanations deeply unsatisfying. Satisfactory explanations are thus pursued through various alternative theories of mind that are difficult to ground in the scientific tradition, and the problem thus arises.

What is truly odd, however, is that even though there are two sides to the debate over the problem, only one side seems to view the problem as problematic. Mechanists, such as Dennett, argue straightforwardly and forcefully that every aspect of consciousness can be grounded in an empirically observable phenomenon, given sufficient time and scientific resources. Proponents of the irreducibility of consciousness, such as Chalmers and Searle, argue that consciousness is the root of all immediate experiences and understandings, which are by their very nature a priori irreducible. Most of the debate seems to focus upon the problem of whether physical things, as we know them, are adequate to account for the complex and varied phenomena of consciousness. The mechanists seem to overlook the admittedly difficult-to-discern motivations that makes the anti-reductionists resist reductionist explanations so strenuously, while the anti-reductionists seem oblivious to the fact that their defenses are essentially nothing more than alternative reductionist explanations based on a non-standard metaphysics.

The debate between these two views evokes very strong reactions, and there seems to be little possibility of philosophically reconciling the two. The progress of scientific explanations of the mind suggests that they may prevail in the long run, but the persistence of anti-reductionist accountings of consciousness also seems to suggest that the anti-reductionist program has an effectively infinite space into which to retreat. (There are, it seems, always new places to which to re-locate spirits and essences.) This kind of impasse, when it appears, is often symptomatic of a fundamental difference of values, but it is deeply troubling to think that the physical or non-physical nature of consciousness should come down to a value judgment. Such a judgment would present a very unappealing choice indeed, between either a disingenuous escape into self-directed self-delusion, or a grim nihilism alienated from the very substance of the most vivid and immediate features of personal experience.

The choice, however, between a physical and a non-physical consciousness is a false one. The real question should not be what consciousness is made of, but in what sense we should think of consciousness as real.

The problem of the problem.

For thinkers like Dennett, consciousness is not a problem at all. Everything that consciousness does can be accounted for, in principle, by a biological mechanism, and the realization of this possibility is enough to make the problem vanish. Dennett’s audaciously titled “Consciousness Explained” (1991) is a meticulous, powerful, and extremely persuasive argument to exactly this effect, and I will proceed from the assumption that Dennet’s argument therein is correct. In this admirable work of philosophy, Dennett skillfully deconstructs the classical arguments against a purely physical basis for consciousness, revealing that the disassembly of their pretenses leaves little more than very subtly concealed, baseless assumptions. There is, however, an important philosophical wrinkle that even Dennett does not seem to notice, and that seems to pass by uncommented elsewhere: the very fact that anti-reductionist theories of consciousness can be engaged so effectively by a mechanist argument implies that these anti-reductionist theories are, in fact, mechanist theories in disguise.

The apotheosis of this kind of mechanism masquerading as idealism is Chalmers’ proposal for a “nonreductive explanation” of consciousness. Chalmers suggests that consciousness ought to be considered as something of an elemental physical force, comparable to gravity or electromagnetism. Certainly, the idea of an as-yet undefined physical force does make consciousness a problem, and the simultaneous elusiveness and irreducibility of this sort of ‘mind-force’ makes the problem hard. Dennett dismisses this proposal by incisively and very correctly pointing out that positing such irreducibility is completely unnecessary from a scientific perspective. If, the argument goes, all the functions and behaviors of consciousness can be elucidated in terms of physical processes, then consciousness itself has been elucidated in terms of physical processes. Beneath this argument is a fundamentally philosophical proposition: a thing is exactly the sum of its distinguishing features. This basic proposition is significant because it can be located not just in mechanist arguments, but also, perhaps surprisingly, in anti-reductionist arguments such as Searle’s “Chinese Room” and the substance of subjective experience posited in the philosophical literature under the name of ‘qualia’. Where anti-reductionists thus part ways with the mechanists is in the sorts of things they consider “distinguishing features”: anti-reductionists consider subjectivity itself, or else some hidden force, to be an irreducible, distinguishing feature, while mechanists do not.

Anti-Reductionists seem unwilling to abandon scientific explanation, but just as unwilling to abandon their assertion that consciousness itself is lodged in an elusive substance or force that is fundamentally distinct from any other kind of physical thing. This conflict is the real heart of the problem of consciousness, but the passion it generates is much more than sentimental attachment to an illogical idea. What anti-reductionists really yearn for is a consciousness as real as the other objects of scientific study.

The real and its discontents.

It deserves to be asked why the idea of an irreducible consciousness is so strongly appealing. Certainly, the anti-reductionist view presents a zoo of logical contradictions, but these contradictions nonetheless seem to be grasping strenuously at something. Dennett seems content to dismiss the anti-reductionist furor as a misguided attachment, but such dismissals do not make for a very satisfying explanation of their motive or persistence. The anti-reductionists are struggling to express something problematic in the language of science. The problem may lie with the thing being expressed, but it may just as easily lie with the language in which it is being expressed.

Science today has established itself as the powerful and very successful arbiter truth. As such, Science has become the language of truth. Inhabitants of the modern world are at great pains to argue otherwise. Every language, however, is haunted by some unutterable. The undesired consequence of the triumph of Science is that some features of human experience are not easily articulated in the language of Science, which places them dangerously near to the realm of the unreal. The subjective experience of consciousness is just such a disturbingly inexpressible thing. While prior eras of thought could attribute this most basic and immediate phenomenon to ‘spirit’ or ‘God’, the language of Science has no words for such things. The reduction of consciousness itself to simpler terms is not problematic for the language of Science, but it nonetheless represents a radical shift of worldview.

Science works in such a way that its objects of concern are public and universal. A scientifically recognizable phenomenon must be something that can be demonstrated to others in a reproducible way. This principle lies at the heart of all empiricism: real things are distinguished from unreal things (lies, hoaxes, delusions, hallucinations, flights of fancy, semantic confusions) by an experiment that situates them within the structure of already agreed-upon things. The power and utility of empiricism is quite evident, and I don’t think it needs discussion here. The modern ethos very often, however, goes beyond a mere acknowledgment of empiricism, assuming instead something much stronger: empirically real is absolutely real.

The reason that I agree with Dennett’s arguments is that consciousness does have behaviors and functions whose underlying mechanisms are, in principle, scientifically demonstrable. What the arguments of Dennett and other mechanists overlook, however, is that consciousness also has fundamentally private aspects that cannot be experimentally reproduced in the empirical sense. The anti-reductionists are mistaken to conflate these private aspects of consciousness with empirically describable features, but they are right in their intuition that some part of this bigger picture eludes even the most thorough empirical reduction. The brute fact is that there is, by definition, nothing objectively or publicly demonstrable about subjective experience. (This fact is what motivates the well-known philosophical problem of how we, as conscious beings, know that other beings are conscious.) If we adopt the view that, with no exceptions, everything real is scientifically describable, then it must be that subjectivity is not real.

Consciousness, according to the mechanist account, is scientifically describable because it can be fully characterized in terms of empirically observable features. Taking this thesis as given, a number of difficult philosophical questions clear right up. For example, the problem how one conscious being can tell if another being is also conscious is fully resolved because, in principle, one such being can go down a list of features to look for, attempt to locate them all, and reach a logical conclusion. Disturbingly, however, new and equally difficult philosophical questions appear in some unexpected places. It may be one thing, in the mechanist scheme, for you to determine whether or not I am conscious, but how can you determine whether or not you yourself are conscious? If you’re reading this sentence right now you probably see nothing particularly problematic in the judgment that you are conscious. It’s just obvious. That, however, is exactly the problem. The fact that you are conscious is so blatantly manifest that it seems to need no explanation at all.

To claim something as ‘obvious’ is not generally regarded to be a scientific explanation. Nonetheless, I find it nothing short of incredible that you, the reader, would regard your own consciousness as nothing less than obvious. Let’s suppose, however, that you really aren’t satisfied with this obvious fact: you want a real, scientific explanation. The good news is that, according to the mechanist perspective, an explanation is available or will be forthcoming in the near future. It is instructive, however, to apply Occam’s Razor at this juncture, and to ask what we actually gain by theory that over-explains the already obvious.

The mechanist state, and the zombie apartheid.

In “Consciousness Explained”, Dennett draws a fascinating connection between social justice and the idea that consciousness is fully empirical. This connection occurs in the context of a deconstruction of Chalmers’ strange philosophical device of the “zombie”, a being that is functionally indistinct from conscious beings but somehow is not itself conscious. Dennett mercilessly excoriates Chalmers’ apparent return to the strange idea of “indiscernible identicals”, and compares the arguments necessary to assert the unconsciousness of a philosophical zombie to those arguments made against the humanity of oppressed people in racist or classist societies. This line of argument is quite convincing; arbitrary and insubstantial distinctions between humans are indeed at the heart of racism and classism. If consciousness is just some undetectable, undefinable essence that can nonetheless be somehow discriminated, the door is opened to all kinds of blatant prejudice. It is interesting to ask, however, whether a radically empiricist accounting of consciousness is capable to producing its own kind of dystopias.

Suppose that you are not satisfied with the obviousness of your own consciousness; you demand scientific verification. True scientific verification, however, is not something that you can do yourself. Evidence for your own consciousness must be reproducible outside of your own personal experience of the situation, and it must be possible for others to view the results and agree on them. Taking this as given, you assemble your friends and conduct a scrupulously careful and well-designed experiment to test whether or not you are conscious. Much to your surprise, however, your friends view the results and come to the unanimous conclusion that you are not actually conscious all; feelings to the contrary must have been just an anomaly stirred up by some unusual external sources of interference. You dispute the results, and so the experiment is repeated again, and then again. Each time, the conclusion reached is the same. Your friends must conclude that, charming character though you are, you’re just not conscious.

It’s one thing to be judged unconscious by a few friends who are nonetheless quite fond of you. What if, on the other hand, the matter of the population of unconscious persons was taken up by the state? Might the state might judge the population of unconscious people to be a nuisance, like stray animals? What if the state even regarded them as a danger, considering their obvious proclivity for mistakes and their almost certain lack of any kind of moral agency? Any well organized society would certainly have a corps of professionals charged with monitoring and evaluating the consciousness of its citizens, and something would certainly need to be done with all of the unconscious people dwelling uncomfortably close to the conscious. Perhaps they could just be imprisoned, or, in a society wishing for a more flattering veneer of compassion, indefinitely institutionalized? If appearances were no object, perhaps the state could simply have unconscious people executed? Everyone has to make a few sacrifices, after all, to maintain a well-ordered society. If you yourself were judged unconscious by such a menacingly state-appointed panel of physicians, surely you would appeal desperately for the truth of your own consciousness, no matter how scientific the refutations presented.

I should be clear, at this juncture, that I do not mean to suggest that mechanist theories of consciousness bear any such authoritarian intent, nor do I mean to suggest that their necessary consequence is a dystopian state in which otherwise upstanding people are coldly adjudicated to be subhuman. What the fable of the zombie apartheid exhibits, however, is a world to which has been dealt a crushing blow to the sanctity of private mental life and to the traditional idea of individual agency. In such a world, your most immediate experiences are nothing but a hollow illusion acted out by incomprehensible, alien forces beyond your understanding and control. In such a world, each one of us turns out, under the gaze of science, not to be quite who we thought we were. Certainly, there is a very real loss in this outcome, and it is this loss that the anti-reductionists surely must sense, and it must be the horror they feel at this sensation that motivates them to struggle so fiercely against reductionist explanation.

The problem with anti-reductionists arguments is that, no matter how clever, they are doomed perpetually to retreat ever-further out of the reach of ever-newer scientific developments. The failure of an anti-reductionist explanation of consciousness is inevitable. The demise of subjective, conscious experience, however, is not.

An explanation of the explanation of consciousness.

The mechanist position proceeds from the very reasonable assertion that things are nothing other than their distinguishing features. If science can reduce those distinguishing features to physical processes, than those things are also physical processes. The fact that such a reduction is emotionally disturbing to behold is not sufficient reason to reject the deduction; it is certainly not an excuse for attempts to escape into pseudoscientific fantasy. Even so, there is something fundamentally different in the reduction of consciousness to physical processes; it appears to radically undermine the worth and veracity of subjective experience by reducing it to things that we can never quite see or fully understand. If we can’t trust our own subjective experience, what can we trust?

One argument is that the remedy lies in the internalization of the facts of natural science as it is understood today. If only we really convincingly saw ourselves as physical processes, the argument goes, there would be nothing disturbing or frightening about reducing consciousness to these very same processes. There is some truth to this view of things, but the truth is not quite a complete one — at least, not if science is to successfully stand in for religion, as it seems it is being called upon to do in this scenario. The lack is well-illustrated by a small thought experiment. Suppose you very successfully convince yourself of the truth that even your most intimate conscious experiences, from which are woven your very identity as a human being, are nothing other than the interplay of physical forces X, Y, and Z. You take X, Y, and Z to be almost sort of personal totems; they are the real truth of your being, even if you aren’t always able to perceive their activity. One day, a startling scientific breakthrough is announced: the theories of forces X, Y, and Z are proven to be completely wrong, and must be replaced by A, B, and C, which are strange and radically different. From the perspective of science, this is completely unproblematic; theories come and go. For individuals, though, theories of self do not come so cheaply; the new development results in a necessary trauma, as you really honestly and sincerely saw X, Y, and Z as your true self, and it turns out that you were mistaken all along. Science, by its very construction, must reject any theory that is convincingly contradicted by observation, and it is of the strongest necessity that there is no telling which theories may be discarded, or what may replace them. Humans, however, rely very crucially upon persistent, relatively unchanging ideas about themselves in which to ground their identity and orient themselves in the world. The prospect of an existence in which our most basic views of ourselves and of the world are ceaselessly rent asunder and reassembled can only be described as hellish. Such a metaphysical suffering may be manageable, but it is certainly not pleasant.

Consciousness is a special kind of problem because it represents the first and most basic fact of existence. Conscious experience is the means by which we build all of our internal models of the world. Without these world-models, we’re hopelessly adrift and helpless. If consciousness itself is just another kind of model, upon which the others are based, the picture of reality begins to look very tenuous indeed. Our models are based on consciousness, and consciousness is based, it would seem, upon a world that lies forever beyond our grasp. Doesn’t all this follow from a reductionist account of consciousness? No, actually. It doesn’t follow at all.

Ontology and metaphysics matter very much at junctures such as this one because they illuminate the foundational assumptions underlying arguments that might otherwise dazzle us with their vivid complexity. There is an irreducibly metaphysical axiom at the heart of all the despair over the reduction of consciousness to physics, and this axiom deserves a close examination. The axiom is this: there is a real world of objects that are outside of, and fundamentally separate from, subjective experience. That is not a scientific deduction. It is not even an obvious fact. It is a pure decision. If this decision is reversed, if we reject the idea of a universal, objective reality, then all the existential horror evaporates.

It will be immediately objected that such a rejection is solipsistic and fundamentally incompatible with scientific thought. This objection holds no water. The idea of a universal, objective reality is only necessary in order to prevent circular definitions. It is not at all clear why circular definitions should be everywhere forbidden, or whether their exclusion may actually prevent the description of very real and very important phenomena. It is true that circularity may introduce paradox, but no matter how confounding or strange paradox may be, there is no universally recognizable principle dictating that paradoxical statements may not be true or meaningful. While arguments to the contrary are delivered very passionately, they are nonetheless at great pains to justify themselves as anything more than axiomatic insistence.

Circularity immediately eludes the alienation of reductionist explanation by way of a beautifully simple argument. Suppose that you grasp that your consciousness is reducible to basic physical processes X, Y, and Z. What makes the reality of physical processes X, Y, and Z apparent is their empirical demonstration. Empirical demonstration is founded upon direct observation, that is, seeing for one’s self. Seeing for one’s self is conscious event. Therefore, processes X, Y, and Z depend upon your consciousness just as much as your consciousness depends upon X, Y, and Z. Since this is so, there is no reason to privilege your understanding of X, Y, and Z as “more true” or “more real” than your own subjective experience. Ergo, your conscious experience is exactly as real as it was before you conceived of it in terms of physical processes.

The mechanist solution to the problem of consciousness could avoid all the humanistic grief it causes if only it would forgo the insistence on having the last word. Consciousness is such that, properly speaking, there can be no last word.

The monstrosity of Hofstadter.

Of all the authors I know, Douglas Hofstadter comes closest to grasping these facts directly. Hofstadter is a truly unique thinker, in that he admits the mechanistic explanation of consciousness, while still acknowledging the irreducibility of the subject. What’s more, Hofstadter even seems to understand the deep relevance of circularity and self-reference to the problem of consciousness. Hofstadter’s magnum opus, “Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid” (often referenced as “GEB” for short), is a vast, playfully brilliant, and strikingly original exegesis of the complex and strangely consciousness-like behaviors of self-reference as it appears in art, music, symbolic logic and other kinds of abstract systems. GEB stands alone as a truly unique work of literature and philosophy, and is well-deserving of its status as a modern classic. Even so, GEB is more poesis than analysis. Well aware of this fact, Hofstadter published “I Am A Strange Loop” (“Strange Loop” for short) in 2007, nearly three decades after the original publication of GEB, as an attempt to refine and more directly articulate the core philosophical ideas of GEB as they pertain to the problems of consciousness. While I have tremendous respect for Hofstadter as a thinker, and tremendous admiration for his intellectual works, I must humbly insist that there is more to say on the matter, and that it ties directly to the problem of an external, substantive reality.

Hofstadter clearly recognizes the importance of circularity in the development of a phenomenon like consciousness, and he even hints at something like irreducibility in his references to formal undecidability in symbolic logics, but he seems unable to break free of the idea of an external reality. While this inability in no way hampers the theoretical development, it nonetheless tinges the exposition with a faint but ineffable tone of sadness. Hofstadter himself makes this tension evident in the “teleportation to mars” scenario, which appears late in “Strange Loop”, and which I’ve discussed elsewhere. To briefly recapitulate, Hofstadter sketches a hypothetical future in which human teleportation is possible, but only in a purely “informational sense” that does not actually relocate the teleported subject, but merely reproduces a perfect copy of it elsewhere in space. Hofstadter then posits a variation on the scenario, wherein the teleportation procedure results in the death of the original subject, e.g. teleportation from Earth to Mars produces an identical subject on Mars, but results in the death of the subject on Earth. As Hofstadter tells it, this scenario reads like a tragedy of subjectivity: even though the self on Earth knows objectively that a perfect copy with all its distinguishing features lives on elsewhere, it still cannot help but feel sorrow and fear at the prospect of its own inevitable demise. The conclusion, although Hofstadter doesn’t seem to state it directly, is that objectified knowledge of the self is not a substitute for subjective experience of the self. Reflected into the problem of consciousness, a reduction of consciousness to objective terms cannot replace the subjective experience of those very terms. Hofstadter’s teleportation story is a vivid, and beautifully sensitive portrayal of exactly what kind of loss the passage from subjectivity to objectivity presents. In the telling of this story, Hofstadter directly reveals the agony of the problem of consciousness: it is none other than the agony of a world divided into internal and external parts.

It’s important not to get lost in mysticism if we’re to understand why the problem really is bound up in the internal-external division. The best way to do so is to deconstruct Hofstadter’s teleportation tale a bit further. I’ll do this by making explicit the assumption of a substantive external reality, from which a reductio ad absurdum appears. The argument is as follows: Suppose that you are the subject on Earth, who is doomed to die as a result of the teleportation procedure. Suppose also that there is a substantive external reality that exists independently of your subjective experience. Since external reality is independent of your subjectivity, it must be that only the objective changes to your circumstances (i.e. the corporeal facts of your death) will have observable effects in the real world, while the subjective changes to your circumstance (i.e. whatever your experience of death and thereafter happens to be) should make no difference. (Interestingly, this is the source of the bleakness perceived by some in the prospect of soullessness: it makes no difference to the world whether or not your subjective self is snuffed out.) Your dual self, on Mars, is a perfect copy of the you (subject and object) on Earth, and so should be functionally indistinct from the self on Earth in all situations. Quantifying over “all situations”, however, is an extremely strong generalization. “All situations”, however, is also unavoidable if the self on Mars is to be considered truly indistinguishable from the self on Earth. Since all situations must be considered, let’s consider the specific situation of how the self on Mars reacts, in terms of its objectively observable behavior, to the death of the self on Earth. Denote by S the situation in which the self on Mars is aware of the demise of the self on Earth. Denote by R the reaction of the self on Mars to the death of the self on Earth, and put aside its details beyond the requirement that it consists of some empirically discernible event. Would the reaction of the self on Earth in situation S be identical to R?

If the reaction is not identical then we’ve already derived an absurdity; the self on Mars was assumed to be a perfect reproduction, and could not be if its functional behavior differed in any way. Suppose, then, that the self on Earth would react with R in situation S. This supposition, however, presents a difficulty, because it is not clear who the subject is in the definition of S. That is, it is not clear who occupies the place of the self on Earth in: “the situation in which the self on Mars is aware of the demise of the self on Earth.” Perhaps S is obtained by the self on Earth imagining what would happen, and concluding that its reaction would be R — but an exercise of subjectivity (i.e. imagination) would be necessary in order to produce this conclusion, which would make the indistinguishability of the two selves, which has been taken as an objective fact, contingent upon an exercise of subjectivity! Perhaps it is instead the case that S is obtained by direct observation of some other objective event, i.e. perhaps the self on Earth had been produced by a prior teleportation, providing the opportunity to observe its particular reaction in that prior situation. It has already been assumed that both the self on Earth and the self on Mars react with R when contemplating the death of their predecessor-selves as a result of the teleportation procedure. The rub, however, is that the observation of R for the self on Earth was obtained by an earlier, identical teleportation procedure which, itself, produced an identical copy of the subject. If the definition of “indistinguishable reactions” is to have any veridical force, then it must be that that the situations that produced those reactions are also identical. In particular, the earlier teleportation procedure from which was obtained the observation that Earth-self’s reaction was R must also have produced an functionally identical copy. More to the point, Earth-self had a predecessor-self that also would have reacted with R! But how can this be empirically determined? Either there must be an infinite regress of observations of prior-selves, which would seem to be impossible, or there must be a prior-self whose reaction differed. If, however, some prior self failed to react with R, it must be that the teleportation procedure does not produce an identical copy, which contradicts the original assumptions — reductio ad absurdum.

The preceding argument may seem rather long, but I feel it is important to firmly ground the seemingly-mystical rejection of an external reality on a logical premise. Hofstadter’s tragedy of the subject is not mere sentimentalism, but an incisive demonstration of a logical contradiction subtly introduced by the conjunction of reductionist explanation and the assumption of substantive, external reality. It is even more illustrative, I think, to show what happens to Hofstadter’s tale when the assumption of an external reality is removed.

Reintroduce all the assumptions of Hofstadter’s original teleportation scenario, and also explicitly assume that there is no substantive, external reality that is separable from subjective experience. A direct consequence of this new assumption (or rather, the negation of the old assumption) is that life decidedly does not go on as normal for the self on Mars; this self, in all its distinguishing features, only represents a substantive object insofar as its characteristics are subjectively experienced by the self on Earth. There is no puzzle about whether it is possible for me to subjectively die on Earth while objectively surviving on Mars, for the simple reason that it is not possible to cleave one from the other. If subjectivity vanishes, then for all meaningful epistemological purposes so do all the things it experiences — the whole universe as you know it is kaput! But isn’t that just solipsism? Weirdly, no, it is not. The foundation of solipsism is the idea that only knowledge of one’s own mind is sure, and at no point did I promise or assert sure knowledge of your mind or its subjective experiences. What many people find disturbing about reductionist explanations of consciousness is that they undercut even the certainty of knowledge about one’s own mind, since mind would thus apparently be at the mercy of physical forces that are alien to direct experience. But what, then, is left if neither external nor internal knowledge is sure? Does everything really just disappear with the subject?

The answer is that nothing actually disappears at all. The assertion I’ve been driving at all along is that the subject depends on the object, and the object depends on the subject. If one vanishes, then it follows logically that other should vanish with it. The subtlety is that it really doesn’t mean anything to say that “the subject vanishes” or “the object vanishes”, since both of these tacitly presume an observer (God? The Universal Hive-Mind? The Laplacian Demon? The Leviathan of State?) before whom they appeared in the first place. Bluntly, there is no reason whatsoever to presume such an observer. (This should not necessarily be read as a declaration of atheism, but I do not wish to pursue theological matters here.) Yes, if the subject disappeared, then so would the object. Following exactly the same reasoning, the disappearance of the object should also herald the disappearance of the subject. This means, in particular, that a subject without any objective formations is just as much an absurdity as an object with no subjective content. Nothing can disappear with subjectivity or objectivity for the straightforward reason that appearance and disappearance are themselves subjective or objective functions. The very act of inquiring after what happens with the expiration of subjectivity is itself a subjective act — we are already talking about not an absolute truth, but the subjectivity of subjectivity. The result of such puzzling appears to be none other than Hofstadter’s ‘strange loop’. What is different is that there is no longer anything either inside of or outside of the loop. What is interesting is that the absence of any such thing, inside or outside, is decidedly not strange.

Consciousness is not the problem.

I assert that what I’ve developed in the above is wholly compatible with mechanist explanations of consciousness; at no point have I required any functions of the mind that are beyond the grasp of scientific explanation. What is different is that reductionist theories no longer have the last word on what is real or unreal; a loop in the reasoning has been closed, with the result that some decided-upon facts will become undecidable. Science has robbed subjective experience of its privilege as the final word on matters of truth, but acknowledgment of the subjective roots of empiricism rob it of the very same privilege The casualty of this exchange is the aesthetic appeal of a “ground truth” or a “hard foundation” from which all other truths can be systematically derived. Truth no longer comes about as a procedural matter of fact, but as a contingency of the situation itself. Some modern thinkers (Alain Badiou, in particular) seem to be already aware of this dynamic, but their work is, to the best of my knowledge, concerned with deep theoretical work in ontology and metaphysics, and has yet to be applied to the purportedly thorny problem of consciousness, which sits awkwardly at the boundary between physics and metaphysics.

The question remains: Why introduce all this extra confusion, when we could be contented with an exhaustively reductionist theory of everything, with objectivity situated firmly at the foundation of the universe? The answer, I think, is that such a universe is fundamentally alienated and bleak. I firmly believe that we should not look askance at facts just because they are unpleasant, but it is important to recognize that foundational world views are not facts — they are choices. The situation of basic views as choices, rather than self-evident facts (whatever those are), does not mean that all are morally equal. Some views are inconsistent with themselves. Some views are too impoverished or simplistic to account for the inscrutable breadth and depth of human experience. Some views are so severe and rigid that they sacrifice truth in the name of their own symbolic order and internal stability. Some views are so fantastical and diffuse as to be totally vacuous. The choice among these is certainly not easy, and there may be no reliable criteria for doing so — especially considering that new ideas are arising all the time. It is important, however, to understand that a picture of the world that makes you unhappy may not be necessary. You should not carelessly replace it with a flattering self-delusion, but neither should you grimly bear its awful weight. A persistent feeling of despair or emptiness is itself nothing other than the sign of a deep contradiction in your view of your self and your world — such contradictions can be, and must be resolved. As much as I agree with Dennett and the many others who have destroyed and discredited the strange and whimsical theories of the anti-reductionists, I also feel very strongly the urgency that drives the anti-reductionists to such baroque flights of intellectual fancy: if the world of subjective experience is smashed to lifeless atoms, then something important really is lost. There is a beauty and dignity to human experience that, no matter how well-analyzed by scientific explanation, is not and cannot be reducible to scientific terms. The tension between the status of the human being and the progress of science has become almost unbearably strong in our lifetimes, and it is important that we find a reconciliation. Such a tension is not bearable forever.

The good news is that the war between science and humanity must not be borne forever. If only we stop clinging to some very old but wholly unjustified habits of thought, the conflict disappears. In the end, nothing could be more scientific than to reject an assumption that has outlived its usefulness, and nothing could be more human than to rejoice at the freedom it brings.

Further reading.

David Chalmers. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”. 1995. Available here.
Daniel Dennett. “Facing Backward on the Problem of Consciousness”. 1995. Available here.
Daniel Dennett. Consciousness Explained. 1991.
Douglas Hofstadter. I Am A Strange Loop. 2007.

Benjamin Schulz is a computer scientist and graduate research assistant at the University of Missouri. His regular blog, “Hot, Cold, Sun, Rain: Practical Spirituality, Irregular Philosophy, and Personal Civics” appears here. 

Helpful resources:

Godisimaginary.com
Iron Chariots Wiki
Skeptics’ Annotated Bible / Skeptics’ Annotated Qur’an
AtheismResource.com
TalkOrigins.org

YouTubers: Evid3nc3, Thunderf00t, TheAmazingAtheist, The Atheist Experience, Edward Current,NonStampCollector, Mr. Deity, Richard Dawkins, QualiaSoup

Blogs: Greta Christina, PZ Myers, The Friendly Atheist, WWJTD?, Debunking Christianity, SkepChick, Rationally Speaking

SASHA Guest Post: “Sam Harris’s flirtation with life after death,” by Rocket Kirchner

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Today’s article is a guest post by musician, activist, long-time friend of SASHA, and Christian evangelist Rocket Kirchner.

In Christopher Hitchens last days, Hitch seemed to be more troubled by Sam Harris postulating the possibility that consciousness can survive the grave than Hitchens constant debate with Theists. With the Atheist/Theist polemic at least he knew where he stood. But not with his fellow Atheist Sam Harris asserting that “one can be a good Atheist and firmly believe that consciousness will continue on after death.” Is this a creedal statment from Harris or merley a flirtation? Or is it just plain open inquiry? Either way, Hitchens response to Harris was, “Be careful, Sam: This manner of inquiry can lead down a slippery slope.” As a Christian practioner myself, and one who has studied for decades the history of Atheism, I am intrigued by Harris’s proposal.

My intrique is two fold: The first is Philosophical, and the second is Sociological. The Philosophical one is obvious: a major player in the New Atheist movement specializing in a subject that many Atheist consider to be not important or taboo. The Sociological intrigue is how this would affect the Atheist-to-Atheist dynamic within its own movement, and also how it would find common ground for an ever-expanding dialogue between the Atheist and the Theist. It is interesting to note that the new Freethinker movement of the post-modern era is now reaching a point where there is a breakdown from a general Zietgiest, to many thinkers in the movement becoming specialists. Historically-speaking, we need not be surpised. This happened in both the pre-Socratic era in Greece, and the post -Socratic era at the Library of Alexandria in Egypt. Harris has indeed found his niche.

Hitchens’s fear of the slippery slope with regard to Harris is that Harris is willing to consider Oxford analytic philosopher Nick Bostrum’s Simulated Universe theory (think the movie The 13th Floor), or Oxford analytic philosopher Galen Strawson’s further probing into John Searle’s work on the mind/body debate. This was both mentioned in their debates with 2 rabbis on the afterlife, which can be found on YouTube [editor's note: Link forthcoming]. There is a real fear that Bostrum and Strawson, if they keep pushing these things, just might end up like former lifelong Atheist-apologist & British analytic philosoper Antony Flew, who actually became a Theist before he died and wrote a book on the subject. If Flew wasn’t safe then no one is. The slope seems to be getting more slippery. Mmm. But I digress.

It must be made clear to the reader at this juncture that Harris has stated emphatically that his position on the possibility of consciousness continuing after death is diametrically opposed to N.T. Wright’s most exhaustive work to date on the alleged literal resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. However, one must ask: To even propose such a concept, is Harris equating reductio ad absurdum with credo qua absurdum? Maybe so, considering the fact that all of this is being met with raised eyebrows. And this raises another question: If Sam Harris was really a true-blue reductionist, in its strictist philosophical definition, why would he even tamper with the possibility that we humans are not our brains? I mean, for crying out loud, the man is a neuroscientist! How can one be an Atheist and not be a reductionist?  His Atomist-Material view of the universe is shakey at best.

Neurophysiologist and Nobel laureate Sir John Eccles said that the he could never find the self in the brain. DNA discoverer Sir Francis Crick challenged that. They both died with the issue unresolved. So we have a Mexican standoff. Which is it? Is the Self only an expression of neurons and synapses firing, or does the Kantian observer stand outside the brain? In other words, where does the locus of the Self actually reside?

The upshot of all of this is this: To ask questions about the plausability of consciousness surviving after death automatically opens up another channel of dialogue about consciousness in the here and now. That was Zeman’s concern, and as the trajectory of inquiry continues, the question of consciousness morphs into the question of what it actually means to be a person, something that Merton and Susuki probed in their interfaith Catholic-Buddhist dialogue. All of this moves deeper into the question of what it means to be human, or what is a human being? And that takes it to that ever-vexing question that has echoed through all of Western philosophy: “The Ex Hypothesis” (aka, the existence of a Supreme Being ). Regardless of Occam’s razor, questions of such serious import always seems to unravel back to sqaure one. And then it all starts up all over again. The slope is slippery, indeed.

Rocket Kirchner is a long-time friend of SASHA. He is a professional musician, pacifism activist, Christian evangelist, and life-long student of philosophy.

Helpful resources:

Godisimaginary.com
Iron Chariots Wiki
Skeptics’ Annotated Bible / Skeptics’ Annotated Qur’an
AtheismResource.com
TalkOrigins.org

YouTubers: Evid3nc3, Thunderf00t, TheAmazingAtheist, The Atheist Experience, Edward Current,NonStampCollector, Mr. Deity, Richard Dawkins, QualiaSoup

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and don’t forget… other SASHA members! We are here for you, too!

The Power of Prayer: Christians Praying for Trivial Crap

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Today’s post is by SASHA guest contributor, Tara Schlotzhauer.

While I may be an atheist, I have many real life friends and acquaintances whom are religious; given that I live in middle of the Bible Belt of Missouri, the religion of choice is Christianity. Thus, it is not surprising that on a daily basis that I see at least one status on Facebook invoking some sort of help from God or thanks to God. At times, they are actually what I would consider legitimate concerns to pray for such as when a loved one is very sick or even dying. While I don’t agree with pray, I understand their need to let people know and the need to invoke good thinking towards them in this time of need.

However, more often than not, I come across a Facebook status where the person is praying for something that I would think is totally inappropriate to ask of God. For example, in the last couple of months, I have seen the following prays: asking for their football team to win the Superbowl/playoffs, asking for a big enough tax return to be able to buy a new Xbox 360/TV, asking for someone to be motivated to take their work shift so they don’t have to work, asking for God to send them someone to love and whom will love them, asking for their parents to buy them a new computer for their birthday, asking for the Supreme Court to overturn a court case where separation of church and state was upheld, etc.

As superficial and silly as I find all of these, I read a status from last night and a follow up this morning by a young high school girl that finally motivated me to write this post and share:

That’s right. A young high school girl spent all weekend not doing her homework (I know from reading other statuses regarding her weekend plans) and prayed for snow (that had already been predicted for days) to cancel classes. Then, when said predicted snow happens and classes are cancelled, she thanks God for the snow day and says this is why she is a Christian. This is also the same girl who, on Friday, posted about how many times she has dropped her phone over the course of the day (twice being in a toilet) but that God must be looking out for her because her phone still works…

I also do not know what is worse: the trivial prayer request or the number of people who liked the statuses (which I take to be agreement or approval).

While I cannot articulately express my frustration over the lack of thought by some Christians regarding the power of prayer, I can relate a great story I heard from another skeptic this past weekend at Reasonfest in Lawrence, KS.

While discussing the power of prayer with a friend who happen to be a preacher, the gentlemen gave the example of how prayer works in our lives by telling of how, a few weeks back, his wife lost her keys and was running late so she prayed for God to help her find her keys and, after a moment, peace surrounded her, she found them. My friend replied to this “touching story of prayer in action” by asking the question: So in order for prayer to work, you have to really mean it and pray really hard? Does that mean that all the families who pray for their family members of cancer did not pray hard enough? Does that mean all the starving children all over the world who prayed to God or had others praying for them did not really mean it? Or was it that God was too busy helping your wife find her car keys to help someone else who really needed his help for something more serious?

Take a moment to re-read that story to let it all sink in.

Scary enough on its own is how often, when I ask Christians why God will answer silly prayers or help people in trivial ways but does nothing about suffering the world, I get to hear these words: “God works in mysterious ways. As mere mortals, we can’t understand his reasoning or his plan but we have to trust in the Lord.”

I’m going to call BS on this. If there is a God and part of his plan includes pain, suffering, starving children, and people dying from horrible diseases, you can count me out. However, the more logical answer is that is either God is not real or, if he is real, is not all powerful or does not take an active hand in the world.

Tara Schlotzhauer is a graduate of the University of Central Missouri with a Bachelor of Science in Photography and her Master of Science in Technology. She is the Secretary of Central Skeptics at the University of Central Missouri and works with her boyfriend and fellow SASHA guest blogger Brandon Christen running the Warrensburg, MO chapter of Recovering from Religion.

Helpful resources:

Godisimaginary.com
Iron Chariots Wiki
Skeptics’ Annotated Bible / Skeptics’ Annotated Qur’an
AtheismResource.com
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Guest Post: Harrison Hopkins

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A special treat for you today: This is a guest post from our friend Harrison Hopkins. Harrison, a Georgia native, is starting a brand new SSA affiliate at Presbyterian College in Clinton, South Carolina, where he will begin as a freshman this fall. Enjoy!

Anyone who attended the Secular Student Alliance Annual Conference (July 29-31) probably had some sort of… “encounter”, we’ll call it, with the people running the Revolution Books table. I did at least, and I’ve read a few other accounts of them walking up to people uninvited to talk about the Revolutionary Communist Party.

In my case, I guess I lucked out. When they talked to me, I didn’t get Communism pushed onto me during the conversation (though it was mentioned). What I got was showered with compliments about how great it is to see young people getting involved, and how I should check out this flyer, oh and this one too, and here check out our newspaper as well. Here, now that we’ve filled up your hands, want to sign up for our email newsletter?

Ugh. I managed to get away without giving them my email (made up an excuse about missing a talk I wanted to see) and shoved all that they gave me into my backpack.

Recently, I decided to take a look at the things they gave me.

First is the flyer talking about bringing Sunsara Taylor to your college campus. It describes her as someone who can speak on the importance of atheism, problems with religion, LGBT rights, abortion, evolution, and then it says she can talk about pretty much anything. Then it goes on to mention that her two favorite topics are “Bob Avakian’s AWAY WITH ALL GODS! Unchaining the Mind and Radically Changing the World” and “End Pornography and Patriarchy; the Enslavement and Degradation of Women”.

Yeah…

Moving on, the next flyer is peddling two of their books, with a coupon to get both for $15. The first book is BAsics: from the talks and writing of Bob Avakian, and a few quotes from it are listed.

The notion of a god, or gods, was created by humanity, in its infancy, out of ignorance. This has been perpetuated by ruling classes, for thousands of years since then, to serve their interests in exploiting and dominating the majority of people and keeping them enslaved to ignorance and irrationality.

Bringing about a new, and far better, world and future for humanity means overthrowing such exploiting classes and breaking free of and leaving behind forever such enslaving ignorance and irrationality.

 

Every religion in the world believes that every other religion is superstition. And they’re all correct.

Minus the bit about overthrowing, my first response was “Hey, this might be a bit interesting”. It seemed relevant enough, being against religion and all.

The next book is Constitution for the New Socialist Republic in North America. No quotes from it are listed (I wonder why?). Unlike BAsics, there wasn’t really a reason to care about it, seeing as I really have no interest in bringing about Communism in America.

The last thing I received from them was Revolution, their newspaper.

Oh, this newspaper… It just SHOUTS the intent that is only hinted at on the flyers, and I’m imagining that it echoes the sentiments of their books and the talks by Sunsara.

I suppose I’ll start at the beginning. On the inside of the front page is a primer about “What is Communist Revolution?” and “Who is Bob Avakian, Chairman of the Revolutionary Communist Party?”

The second one is a bit laughable, seeing as it answers itself in the question. Here’s an excerpt from it:

In Bob Avakian, the Chairman of our Party, we have the kind of rare and precious leader who does not come along very often. A leader who has given his heart, and all his knowledge, skills and abilities to serving the cause of revolution and the emancipation of humanity.

It goes on and on about how he founded the party, how he’s developed theory and strategy for revolution, how he’s developed theory and strategy for revolution, how he’s developed theory and strategy for revolution… It does get rather repetitive.

The first five pages of the newspaper are mostly articles about or by Bob Avakian, about how to plan for revolution, where BAsics needs to be given out (hint: high schools), how terrible the world is now, and how magnificent humanity will be after the revolution.

The next few pages have articles about black youth having no future under our current system, abortion doctors, and a hunger strike at a prison against solitary confinement. These are actually somewhat interesting articles, if you look past the incredible slant they have.

Finally we get to a page with a few letters from people who read BAsics. One stood out to me:

This following letter from a prisoner was forwarded by the Prisoners Revolutionary Literature Fund

Postmark: 27 JUN 2011

Prisoner’s Revolutionary Literature Fund. (Respect and love for our leader Bob Avakian)

Thank you for receiving this letter, With-in the past month I was sent a copy of BAsics, from the talks and writings of Bob Avakian. I Am Writing to Report that the book was an instant success in the Restorative justice class that I teach! For the past 2 weeks my student’s have been passing the book around and wrangling over the statement’s of power Bob Avakian made to trance-form the People for Revolution. When asked to take the word “BAsics” and scientifically transmute it into acronym’s related to what they’ve learned, this is what they said:

Bob Avakian Says Injustice Can Stop

Bob Avakian Says I Can Soar

Bob Avakian Says Imperialism Cant Survive

Bob Avakian Says I Can Serve

Bob Avakian Says I Can Speak

Bob Avakian Says Independence Can Start

BAsics Are Samples I Can Study

Bob Avakian Says I Can Succeed

(sic)

At this point, I set the paper down and said “Holy shit”. It goes on though:

I am very proud of my student’s and the creative energy they put into completeing this task. I think what they’ve done is equally as unique as the book. And the last task I gave them was to give life to the book by spreading it’s core
message amongst the inmate population of 2000 prisoners. There is no doubt that our leader is leading. Bob Avakian is the truth! We are with you 100%, In the Constitution for the New Socialist Republic in North America we trust! Learn the basics–join the struggle, become a part of the change.

Respectfully,

Restorative Justice!

(sic)

Wow.

This doesn’t seem to be casting away “ignorance and irrationality” as Avakian wanted in an earlier quote. Or maybe ignorance and irrationality is only a bad thing when it’s not for your own cause? That’s what it seems like in this case, as all this is doing is transferring the blind worship of a god to blind worship of him.

Am I mistaken, or isn’t this the kind of thinking what the secular movement is against?

Maybe Revolution Books and the RCP didn’t quite understand the kind of people that would be at the SSA conference. Or maybe, just maybe, they were hoping to lure us in with their anti-religion stance, so that we’d be more open to their bullshit.

—

Harrison Hopkins is an atheist student leader, founder of the new SSA affiliate at Presbyterian College, and friend to the regular SASHA contributors. Thanks, Harrison, for your guest post—you’re welcome here anytime!